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Generally, people who have had the opportunity 
to observe nonhuman animals, especially vertebrates, 
for any length of time take for granted that these beings 
are conscious and capable of suffering. If we are 
pressed to give a rational defense of this belief, we 
can have no better start than the inductive argument 
from analogy to other minds from one's own case. 
Beings who are neurologically highly similar to me 
and who respond in complex, creative ways to stimuli 
that also elicit my responses are probably conscious 
just as I am. This is an extraordinarily strong inductive 
argument, fulfilling all criteria for good two-case 
analogical reasoning, licensing one to infer that 
another, be the other human or nonhuman, is not 
merely a cleverly contrived machine.! Those who are 
skeptical about induction as such are, of course, not 
persuaded by the argument, but they also cannot be 
persuaded about the existence of their own bodies, let 
alone anyone else's. Short of solipsism, one seems not 
to be irrational in putting one's confidence in the 
argument from analogy. 
Ren6 Descartes had doubts about the exten­
sion of this argument to nonhumans: This 
argument, which is very obvious, has taken 
possession of the minds of all men from their 
earliest age. But there are other arguments, 
stronger and more numerous, but not so 
obvious to everyone, which strongly urge the 
opposite. One is that it is more probable that 
worms and flies and caterpillars move mecha­
nically than that they all have immortal souls.2 
Philosophically, Descartes' counter to the argument 
from analogy is not plausible for many reasons,3 
including the fact that it is wedded to a version ofmind­
body dualism fraught with well-known difficulties. 
Scientifically, the argument from analogy has grown 
even stronger since Descartes' time. It has been 
buttressed by centuries of observation, much of it done 
at great cost to nonhuman animals, that reveal complex, 
detailed similarities between human and nonhuman 
vertebrate nervous systems. We know that many 
nonhuman animals have the same pain mechanisms we 
do, and their behaviors are consistent with this fact. 
Even some invertebrates appear to have some parts of 
this mechanism.4 Moreover, as Bernard RollinS and 
James Rachels6 have argued, we fly in the face of the 
superbly confirmed theory of evolution if we assume 
that consciousness is a uniquely human trait. Logic, 
science, and common sense all point to the existence of 
nonhuman animal suffering. 
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Nevertheless, as Rollin (a professor of physiology 
and biophysics as well as a professor of philosophy) 
has painstakingly documented, some scientists even to 
this day persist in denying that animals can experience 
pain, relying implicitly on the philosophically long­
discredited views of logical positivism and behaviorism. 
He is cautiously optimistic about the fact that it is 
becoming scientifically respectable once more to 
attribute conscious states to nonhumans in the social 
and natural sciences.7 Ironically, if two current 
philosophers, Peter Harrison8 and Peter Carruthers,9 
writing independently, have their way, scientists might 
as well return to the practice ofnailing research animals 
to boards for vivisection without benefit of anesthesia. 
Descartes' views are with us again, albeit in con­
temporary dress. 
Now, quite a few of us regard it as screamingly 
obvious that nonhuman animals can suffer. Is it not a 
waste of time to critique such articles? Unfortunately, 
it is not. Philosophers have been enormously influential 
in shaping attitudes toward nonhuman animals. 
Descartes, a scientific experimentalist whose own 
interest in the issue ofnonhuman animal treatmentwas 
not purely philosophical, had a profound effect on the 
practice ofvivisection. Long before anesthesia became 
available, experimenters taking apart yelping animals 
in laboratories laughed at the sounds, comparing them 
to clocks striking the hour. lO (Rachels notes that some 
researchers must have found all the noise distracting, 
however, rmding it prudent to sever the animals' vocal 
cords. Some clocks do need to be muffled. II) Later, two 
hundred years after Descartes' death, Claude Bernard, 
a pioneer in experimental physiology, routinely 
vivisected complex animals, speaking of them in 
these terms: 
It is necessary, so to speak, to take an organism 
to pieces in successive stages, in the same way 
that one dismantles a machine, in order to 
recognize and to study its working parts,12 
Although anesthesia was in practice then, Bernard 
never used it, any more than he would have tried to use 
it on a timepiece. (His wife and daughters found 
themselves unable to share his views; they originated 
the first European anti-vivisection society after coming 
home one day to discover that Bernard had vivisected 
the family dog.13) Even now, as Rollin reports, the 
occasional veterinarian (of all people) will publicly 
proclaim that anesthesia in operations on animals is 
merely a method of"chemical restraint," having nothing 
whatever to do with pain relief.14 
As mentioned before, the philosophical movement 
of logical positivism has also had its influence on 
science: any discussion of conscious states in 
nonbumans (or, for that matter, humans) was ruled out 
as meaningless because such claims cannot be tested 
by observations. All claims about values fell by the 
wayside as well, reducing any ethical dilemmas a 
researcher might have to emotional, rationally 
irresolvable matters of taste. This view is no longer 
taken seriously by philosophers-for one thing, logical 
positivism cannot pass its own criterion of meaning­
fulness-but its influence can still be seen in 
psychology, biology, and physics. In short, philo­
sophical views do matter in the conduct of science, 
particularly when these views have implications many 
scientists find attractive. (Scientists are hardly unique 
in this regard, to be sure.) 
Some will find the articles by Carruthers and 
Harrison, with their conclusion that animal suffering 
is for the most part a myth, quite attractive. IS These 
articles come at a time when many research scientists 
are mounting a counterattack on those who charge that 
their work with nonhumans is unethical. Both articles 
appeared in journals of philosophy with very high 
reputations (indeed, Carruthers' piece was published 
by the journal with the top reputation in analytic 
philosophy in the world), and their influence is already 
spreading. Harrison's article has recently been 
excerpted in a popular anthology on nonhuman animal 
research. 16 Defenders of factory farming, commercial 
hunting and trapping, and the use of nonhuman 
animals in product testing will likely also see these 
essays as contributions to their counterattacks. Both 
philosophers explicitly draw the obvious ethical 
consequences of their conclusions, Harrison only 
briefly-"Such causes as animal liberation may have 
to be rethought"17~and Carruthers at greater length. 
He expresses indignation at the charge that factory 
farming involves animal cruelty, terming this attack 
"morally objectionable" and going so far as to declare 
that we have a "moral imperative" to cease feeling 
sympathy for nonhuman animals.18 
Thus, it is important to respond to such philo­
sophical argumentation. It is especially important that 
the response be rationally defensible. Otherwise, one 
is apt to be dismissed as a purely emotional 
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anthropomorphic fantasizer when one objects to the 
rubbing of noxious substances into immobilized 
rabbits' eyes. I will argue that reason, not just emotion, 
severely undermines the denial of nonhuman animal 
suffering. Most ofmy time will be spent on Harrison's 
piece. Carruthers' article has already been ably 
attacked by philosopher Edward Johnson,19 so I will 
confine myself to additional important problems with 
it. In the end, it should be clear that these defenses of 
the animal-as-machine model are no more successful 
than the one Rene Descartes proposed in the mid­
seventeenth century. 
Harrison's Attack on Nonhuman Animal Suffering 
Peter Harrison tries to turn the supporting evidence 
for the argument from analogy on its head. He argues 
that evolutionary theory actually undercuts the 
assumption that nonhumans can experience pain. He 
denies the relevance of the copiously documented 
similarities between human and nonhuman animals. 
Overall, he claims to be defending Descartes' 
conclusion without the encumbrance of Descartes' 
metaphysics. His purpose is explicitly theological. He 
believes that the existence of human suffering can be 
reconciled with the existence of God because (a) 
suffering caused to humans by humans is the price of 
free will and (b) suffering due to natural causes builds 
human character. On the other hand, he believes that 
nonhuman animal suffering cannot be explained away 
in these terms,20 Thus, he quite literally explains it away 
in other terms, i.e., by denying that there is any such 
phenomenon. (As we shall see, he also must deny the 
existence of suffering in very young children-a 
decided theological bonus). The argument he gives to 
convince us is, he warns us, not a "strict" argument 
against the existence of nonhuman animal pain, due to 
the fact that pain is essentially private,21 but he does 
claim to make a plausible case for his contention. Let 
us now tum to his argument. 
A. Why nonhuman animal pain allegedly does not exist 
Harrison's argument can be summarized as follows: 
1. Many kinds of pain could have no evolutionary 
value for nonhuman animals; quite the contrary. 
This includes frustration, anxiety, grief, and severe 
debilitating pain. 
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2. We know humans experience such pains (or that 
we do, atany rate!); we survive them because we 
are insulated by our cultures from the effects of 
natural selection. 
3. Other, lesser pains would have no evolutionary 
value to nonhuman animals either, because: 
a. Nonhuman animals can make	 no choices. 
Survival-enhancing behaviorcan be determined 
without the "superfluous" experience of pain, 
as studies of reflex actions show. 
b. The argument from analogy that leads us to 
believe otherwise is bad because 
(1) so-called ''pain behavior" in nonhumans 
is no more than an adaptive response, as is 
shown by the different behaviors of, e.g, a 
wildebeest and a chimp in circumstances 
we would fmd painful. 
(2) The very minimal difference in physiology 
between humans and nonhuman animals 
has no bearing on pain: "It has long been 
recognized" that pain is an overwhelmingly 
psychological phenomenon because: 
(a) Aristotle, Spinoza, and Ryle hold that 
pain is not really a sensation. 
(b) Psychological factors can playa major 
role in pain perception. 
c.	 Nonhuman animals could "learn" from 
experiences we would find painful, thus 
enhancing their survival chances, without 
having any conscious experiences at all, as is 
shown by studies of habituation in protozoa. 
4. Humans experience lesser pains, as we know, 
not to ensure our survival (see 2), but to "free us 
from instinct" when we choose to endure or not 
endure pain. All pain is a complex phenomenon 
experienceable only by highly developed 
"conscious egos." Nonhuman animals lack the 
complexity required for consciousness. 
Therefore, it is highly probable that humans differfrom 
nonhumans in haVing a capacity to experience pain. 
Between the Species 
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The rationales for Harrison's major contentions will 
be discussed, followed by responses to those rationales. 
The contention that evolutionary theory rules out
 
severe, debilitating pain and "mental" pain such as
 
anxiety, grief, frustration, etc., in nonhumans
 
Harrison's fIrst two premises rely on this contention. 
He makes this assertion on the simple ground that such 
pains have no survival value. In fact, pains of this kind 
often interfere with one's survival. Hence, "the canons 
of evolutionary dogma" do not permit the attribution 
of such experiences to nonhuman animals. Humans, on 
the other hand, do have such experiences, as one knows 
from one's own case. We have them despite their 
unhelpful consequences because we have "thwarted 
natural selection:" human culture in general insulates 
us from the ravages of nature, keeping such painful 
experiences from threatening human existence.22 Thus, 
evolutionary theory is allegedly compatible with the 
existence of these experiences in humans but incom­
patible with their existence in nonhumans. 
This contention is inadequately supported for a 
number of reasons. First of all, Harrison simply. 
misunderstands evolutionary theory. No evolutionary 
biologist would claim that every trait possessed by a 
typical member of a species has to have survival value. 
As Stephen Jay Gould puts it, "[the] imperfection of 
nature reveals evolution."23 Very colloquially speaking, 
a large part of inheritance is a crap shoot. Variation is 
due to mutations, which are copying errors in the genetic 
code, and most of these mutations are neither 
enormously helpful nor destructive. Individuals can 
survive and pass on their traits even if some of those 
traits are not particularly advantageous and might at 
times even interfere with survival. As Niles Eldridge 
says, "[that] some of these biological mistakes may 
ultimately prove to be benefIcial is all evolutionists have 
ever claimed."24 It is individuals with their collection 
of more or less benefIcial, neutral, and harmful traits 
who are subject to natural selection, not the individual 
traits themselves.25 Harrison also does not consider the 
possibility that a trait may be harmful in some 
circumstances and benefIcial in others (intelligence is 
one trait that comes to mind in this connection) or that 
it may be harmful in the short run but useful in the long 
run. For example, frustration might lead one to make 
benefIcial changes in one's circumstances; grief is the 
consequence of caring, a trait that strengthens bonds 
Between the Species 30 
with one's offspring; chronic pain may be destructive, 
but the mechanism responsible for it could be very 
constructive indeed in other circumstances.26 Moreover, 
Harrison provides no independent grounds for thinking 
that nonhumans cannot experience grief, anxiety, 
frustration, or chronic pain. To Harrison, the behavior 
of a cat or dog who ceases to eat when a companion 
human or nonhuman dies must be inexplicable, as would 
be the behavior ofclosely confIned nonhumans in zoos, 
on farms, and in research laboratories. Even the most 
unsentimental nonhuman animal scientists are 
beginning to speak openly about such states in their 
subjects. 27 "Porcine Stress Syndrome" (PSS) and 
"mourning behavior" in tightly restrained sows are 
conditions identilled and named by the pork industry 
itself. Psychologists whose research involves the 
induction of grief, anxiety, anguish and psychosis in 
nonhumans would also disagree with Harrison. 
Harrison also gives us no good reason to believe 
that humans differ fundamentally from nonhumans in 
their experiences of "harmful" pains. No evidence 
whatever is given to support his contention that humans 
alone have escaped the strictures of natural selection. 
Did primitive humans hundreds of thousands of years 
ago have no such experiences? Or did they somehow 
"thwart" natural selection as modem humans allegedly 
have? Presently, one might say that in some societies 
medical care allows us to save those who would 
otherwise die before being able to reproduce, but this 
has only been so for a short while in human history, 
and not universally so even then. It is also simply false 
to say that debilitating pain, depression, anxiety, etc., 
do not threaten our survival. Stress-related severe 
illnesses, cancer included, not to mention suicide, 
indicate otherwise. Harrison even quotes, to support 
his own view, a researcher's claim that chronic human 
pain interferes with human survival.28 By his own 
argument above, employed against the possibility of 
such experiences in nonhumans, humans should also 
not be capable of them. If he were to reply that the 
human species as a whole is able to continue despite 
these individual deaths because most of us do not 
succumb to these very negative pains or are able to 
replace our deaths with the lives ofoffspring, why could 
this not also be true of nonhumans? Contrary to 
Harrison, evolutionary biologists see continuity rather 
than discontinuity between nonhumans and humans. 
Allan C. Wilson argues that "the brain ofmammals and 
birds" can itself drive evolution by allowing members 
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of a species to begin interacting with a habitat in new 
ways, ways that themselves expose members of the 
species to new selection procedures, leading to the 
perpetuation of individuals with different traits.29 
Wilson is hardly alone in attributing ingenuity, 
creativity, and intelligence to nonhumans.3o Why 
shouldn't "negative" traits also be shared by humans 
and nonhumans? 
In short, Harrison has not shown that evolutionary 
theory supports his view that only humans could 
experience seriously harmful pains (premises 1and 2). 
Instead, there is good reason to believe otherwise. 
The contention that"lesser" pains would also have
 
no evolutionary value for nonhumans
 
Having rejected the view that nonhumans are 
capable of complex, counter-productive sorts of pain 
experiences, Harrison goes on to consider the claim that 
the ability to experience simple, useful pains would 
confer an adaptive advantage on nonhuman animals. 
He rejects this claim as well (premise 3 above), 
primarily on the grounds that the point of such a 
mechanism would be to allow the animal to make 
survival-enhancing choices. Since, in Harrison's view, 
no nonhuman is capable of making a choice, such a 
mechanism would be gratuitous at best: 
If no 'choice' is involved in animal behavior,
 
why should they suffer pain-to compel them
 
to behave in certain ways? No, for surely their
 
behavior is determined in a way that does not
 
require the superfluous promptings of pain.31
 
This stage of Harrison's argument (premise 3a) is 
faulty for at least two reasons. First, he relies on the 
undefended assumption that the capacity to choose is 
incompatible with the deterministic thesis that all 
behavior is caused by events which are in tum caused, 
etc. The classic problem faced by such a view is how to 
construe an uncaused choice in a meaningful way, not 
merely as an inexplicable, random event. If we reject 
the view that choice and causation are incompatible (Le., 
the view that all causation must be compulsion), it 
makes perfectly good sense to interpret pain as part of 
the causal sequence leading to a wolf cub's refusal to 
play with the next porcupine in her path. Why should 
the experience of pain be "superfluous" in this series 
ofevents? I can fathom but one reason for such a claim: 
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Harrison seems to be assuming that conscious 
experiences can have no role in nonhuman animal 
behavior. Pain would be unnecessary because, allegedly, 
the nonhuman animal simply responds, puppet-like, to 
the external forces acting upon her.32 Pain in these 
circumstances would not be survival-enhancing. Yet, 
this is the very thesis that Harrison is trying to persuade 
us to accept: the thesis that animals are machines. He 
can hardly convince us of this thesis by appealing to it 
in his premises! This leads to the second and related 
major problem with Harrison's line of argumentation 
here. He simply assumes without argument that only 
humans can make choices. Since considerable, 
respectable evidence to the contrary has been amassed 
by ethologists,33 Harrison should at least address that 
body of information. He makes no such attempt. 
Instead, Harrison now turns to the argument from 
analogy, rightly recognizing that it seems to provide 
powerful support for the contention that animals can 
experience at least simple pains. He rejects it for two 
reasons. First of all (premise 3b-l), he judges it to be 
scientifically unsupported, fanciful thinking: 
we tend to presume that certain animal 
behaviors are expressions ofpain-an internal 
state-whereas they should properly be 
construed as adaptive behaviors which 
probably have some social significance.34 
Harrison asks us to consider a wildebeest being killed 
by wild dogs and a chimpanzee with a thorn in his foot. 
The chimpanzee screams pitiously, "as if in pain," but 
the wildebeest makes no outcry.35 The chimpanzee 
behaves as we expect, the wildebeest does not, but each 
is responding in a generally "adaptive" way: it is to 
chimpanzees' advantage in thorny situations to get aid; 
it is not to wildebeests' advantage to expose the rest of 
the herd to predators. Neither, Harrison assumes, is 
really experiencing pain; they are simply doing 
evolution's bidding. 
This is not a convincing attack on the argument from 
analogy. Harrison's claim that nonhuman animal 
behaviors are adaptive rather than expressions of pain 
is a clear instance of the fallacy of false dilemma. 
Behaviors can be expressions ofpain and have adaptive 
significance as well. Harrison thinks not, presumably 
because he believes that his wildebeest-chimpanzee 
example shows (a) the wildebeest experiences no pain 
and (b) there is no reason to think that chimpanzees 
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differ from wildebeests in this regard. He considers the 
possibility that both might be experiencing pain, but 
turns it into a "straw possibility" by caricaturing that 
position. He describes the belief that the chimpanzee is 
being an oversensitive coward whereas the wildebeest 
is stoically enduring agony as "crudely anthro­
pomorphic."36 This may be so, but it does not show the 
belief that the two are expressing their pain differently 
to be anthropomorphic. We must indeed guard against 
using the argument from analogy in a simplistic way, 
but it is Harrison who is guilty of doing this here, not 
those who believe that nonhumans can experience pain. 
In fact, Rollin has argued that those who deny that 
nonhumans could be experiencing pain if they do not 
behave exactly as we do are the ones guilty of 
anthropomorphism.37 
The view that vertebrate nonhuman aninials can 
experience pain is consonant with the neurophysio­
logical similarity of human and nonhuman species-a 
similarity Harrison fully concedes38-and evolutionary 
theory. Humans generally yell, just as our 98.4% 
genetically similar chimpanzee cousins do, when we 
get large thorns in our appendages. We also happen to 
be experiencing pain when we do this; is it anthro­
pomorphic to believe that chimpanzees do too? As for 
the wildebeest, who possesses the same nervous system 
that is linked to pain perception in our case, behavior 
that does not endanger the rest of the herd obviously 
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does have an adaptive advantage; this is compatible with 
the suffering of the animal. There is yet another 
alternative. Humans have reported that sometimes, at 
times of great physical trauma, physical damage that 
one would expect to cause excruciating pain is somehow 
suspended. Later, if one survives the trauma, the pain 
comes roaring in. This phenomenon is known as "stress­
induced analgesia."39 A response of this kind would be 
advantageous, not only to the individual who is 
momentarily spared agony, who may then be able to 
concentrate on fighting for life or at least not die 
instantly of shock, but to the species as a whole. Perhaps 
the wildebeest, and others in similar circumstances, is 
being naturally anesthetized. While we can hope that 
this is so, such a possibility must remain speculative at 
this point.4o Note, however, that this interpretation of 
the wildebeest's behavior is fully compatible with the 
argument from analogy: it grows out ofhuman reports, 
is in line with our similar physiologies, and actually 
contradicts Harrison's claim that only humans are 
capable of pain perception (and hence of being 
anesthetized). Harrison has not shown his machine 
model of nonhuman animal behavior to be more 
plausible than either the suffering or the stress-induced 
analgesia hypotheses. 
At this point, Harrison launches his second attack 
on the argument from analogy (premise 3b-2). Since 
he cannot and does not deny that there is between 
humans and many nonhumans an overwhelming 
physiological similarity in respects relevant to pain 
perception, he chooses to dismiss the importance of this 
similarity instead. He cites Aristotle, Spinoza, Ryle, and 
some twentieth-century psychological research to 
buttress his view that "pain is associated with 'higher' 
faculties, the study of which is more properly 
psychological than physiological.,,41 He then leaps to 
the conclusion that pain is primarily a psychological 
phenomenon, joins it to the conclusion that psycho­
logical factors do not operate in nonhumans, and asserts 
that "[a]ll human experiences of pain, I have argued, 
are functions of our distinctive consciousness, and thus 
cannot be shared by our furry friends."42 Harrison 
claims to be eschewing Cartesian dualism in drawing 
this overall conclusion: he holds that we, unlike him, 
commonly assume that nonhumans experience pain 
because we associate pain with the body and more 
complex pains such as frustration, anxiety, etc., with 
the mind: thus the common view is (supposedly) that 
nonhumans are capable of the former but not the latter. 
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This won't do. Despite his disclaimer, Harrison is 
the one who appears to cling to Cartesian dualism, 
construing all pain as part of the mind rather than the 
body. He provides no evidence sufficient to establish 
this sweeping conclusion (eminent as Aristotle, 
Spinoza, and Ryle were, they have been known to be 
wrong, and the psychological studies he cites from 
the 1950s are either thoroughly outdated by current 
research43 or irrelevant to the dismissal of physiology 
in favor ofpsychology). No one these days denies that 
beliefs and emotions can affect pain perception: it does 
not follow from this that pain is a psychological rather 
than a physiological phenomenon. Moreover, Harrison 
does not address the evidence that nonhumans 
apparently can also be affected by psychological 
factors when they are in situations we would regard 
as painfill in our own cases (e.g., as is the case for 
humans, companion nonhuman animals show less 
"distress" when ill if they are treated kindly rather than 
coldly and clinically).44 His argumentation on this head 
is quite simply question-begging: pain is primarily 
psychological (an unsupported contention); nonhuman 
animals have no psyches to speak of (also unsupported); 
thus nonhuman animals experience no pain. They are 
machines because they are machines. 
Finally, in his attempt to show tfuit a pain mechanism 
would provide no evolutionary advantage to non­
humans, Harrison tries to show that they could "learn" 
from experiences that would cause pain to us without 
being conscious at all (premise 3c). When we touch a 
very hot surface, we instantly, reflexively, withdraw; 
the experience of pain comes after the withdrawal,so 
the experience has not caused us to act. Harrison 
believes this sbows conscious awareness of pain to be 
unnecessary for the production of survival-enhancing 
behavior. 45 Tbus, he holds, evolutionary processes 
would not favor the emergence of a capacity for pain in 
nonbumans. (He recognizes that this poses a puzzle for 
the existence ofhUflUln pain. His way of trying to resolve 
that puzzle will be discussed below.) 
Once again, this line of argument fails to support 
Harrison's conclusion. Withdrawing from a flame is 
indeed a reflex action rather than a consciously 
motivated response to pain, but avoiding the flame the 
next time is another matter. Nonhumans are at least as 
likely as humans to avoid situations of this kind after 
their initial occurrence. This can hardly be construed 
as reflex action, and it is difficult to see bow it would 
occur if a painful experience bad no part in the prior 
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incident. In our own case, pain seems to be higbly 
instructive, as humans wbo lack the pain mechanism 
discover (provided they live long enougb to arrive at 
that realization). Nonbumans do not behave as if they 
could never experience pain; they behave as if they learn 
from it. As Harrison himself admits, nonbumans are 
used in pain research and can be, as be puts it, 
"conditioned by 'pain.' "46 
The best that Harrison can do in trying to make sense 
of the fact that nonhumans can learn from nonexistent 
pain is to cite the example of protozoan "learning." He 
cites a study in which these one-celled beings exbibited 
habituation to a repeated stimulus.47 Clearly, he thinks, 
this shows that learning ("learning"?) does not require 
consciousness. Although he denies that he is claiming 
that all learning in nonhumans is of this sort, this must 
be·what he believes, given his macbine model. Yet this 
sort of response by a one-celled organism bears no 
relation to a wolf's refusal to tangle with her second 
porcupine, a dog's cowering away from a human wbo 
has beaten him but once before, or a goat's avoidance 
ofan electrified fence that once gave ber a shock. These 
are not acts of blind habituation. Harrison gives us no 
way to fathom these behaviors. 
Harrison, therefore, has not sbown that the capacity 
to experience pain would have no evolutionary 
advantage for nonbumans. What of the fact that humans, 
who have also evolved, do experience pain? Harrison 
turns to this question in bis premise 4. 
The explanation ofhUflUln pain 
"Why do we feel pain if animals do not?," asks 
Harrison.48 He makes no attempt to relate the capacity 
for pain to an evolutionary advantage for humans, 
despite his admission that humans who lack the capacity 
are not long for this world.49 Of course, it would be 
difficult for him to· argue that the experience gives 
humans an adaptive advantage when be believes be bas 
shown that it provides no such advantage to nonhumans. 
Moreover, bis contention that bumans are not subject 
to natural selection pressures (premise 2) would be in 
direct contradiction io such an attempted explanation. 
The explanation be does provide is rather curious. He 
bolds that humans, unlike nonbumans, are capable of 
freedom ofchoice, and pain allegedly enables us to act 
deliberately rather than instinctively. Harrison 
believes that tbe capacity for pain is a necessary 
condition for freedom of the will: 
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What is distinctive about the human race is 
our ability to choose...We are free, in painful 
situations, to damage our bodies if we believe 
that there is a higher priority ...Pain frees us 
from the compulsion of acting instinctively; 
it issues harsh warnings, but they are 
warnings which may be ignored. It is our 
capacity for pain which has given rise to those 
uniquely human attributes of courage, 
resignation, self-control, perseverance, 
endurance, and their opposites, and it is 
significant that we reserve these terms for 
ourselves...Free will is at the high cost of 
suffering, but it is a suffering which is rightly 
restricted to the human realm.50 
This is a very puzzling argument. First of all, pain 
seems to be more a hindrance than a help to choice­
making as Harrison conceives it. Wouldn't it be a great 
deal easier to defy "instinct" if we were not subject to 
pain? We normally act to avoid being burned, stabbed, 
kicked, etc. , just as many nonhumans do. (In the world 
as it has developed this helps us one and all to survive, 
but this line of argument is not open to Harrison, as 
we saw above.) Now, I do not claim that such 
avoidance behavior is unfree (unlike Harrison, I do 
not think that freedom and causation are incompatible), 
but Harrison is reaching for a concept of freedom that 
is unique to human behavior. He has not shown us 
how pain "frees us [in his sense] from the compulsion 
of instinct." 
Harrison might reply that only humans can act 
despite pain; Le., we are uniquely capable of courage, 
endurance, perseverance, etc. This is freedom in the 
highest sense, one might hold, the putting of other 
considerations over our own well-being. Without pain, 
Harrison could say, we have no barometerof well-being, 
and terms like"courageous" becomeempty (as do terms 
like "cowardly"). Nonhumans, however, sometimes 
behave as if they, too, defy pain. When we behave in 
these ways, we garner moral credit for ourselves; when 
they do, Harrison regards them as machines. He is not 
the only one to engage in double-standard thinking here: 
a human mother who attacks an armed criminal 
threatening her children, risking injury and death, is 
"heroic" and "courageous;" a harp seal mother who 
charges a seal hunter, finally throwing herself across 
her pup, taking the skull-shattering bashing intended 
for her offspring, is "just acting instinctively!" Harrison 
may take it for granted that we reserve praiseworthy 
terminology for ourselves, but it is far from clear that 
this is justified.51 
Why, indeed, should humans be able deliberately 
to flout their own well-being and nonhumans be 
incapable of doing such a thing? What naturalistic 
explanation could account for such an alleged 
difference? Certainly, deliberate action requires some 
intelligence, but as Harrison concedes in a footnote,52 
nonhumans can display high degrees of intelligence, 
too. Human children and some brain-damaged humans 
can also act in self-sacrificial ways, and their 
intellectual development may not differ significantly 
from the corresponding capacities of some non­
humans. I strongly suspect that Harrison has no 
naturalistic explanation of the difference he (and many 
others) believes to obtain between human and 
nonhuman behaviors. The language in his remark that 
"[f1ree will is at the high cost of suffering, but it is a 
suffering which is rightly restricted to the human 
realm" is redolent of a theological explanation.' 
Harrison, remember, is grappling with and trying to 
defeat the argument from evil against the existence of 
God. As he sees it, human suffering must be good for 
us, make us better persons; since he seems to take for 
granted that nonhumans are not capable of such 
betterment, he finds it necessary to deny that they 
suffer at all. Those without Harrison's theological 
presuppositions will be left unconvinced by such 
argumentation.53 
Finally, it is not difficult to conceive of a being who 
could make choices-including morally praiseworthy 
choices-without ever experiencing pain; God would 
be an outstanding case in point. Nor need we reach so 
high or so controversially for an example: surely 
Harrison would not claim that humans who lack the 
capacity for pain are unable to make choices. 
Thus Harrison has failed on all counts in his attempt 
to show that the experience of pain is a necessary 
condition for an allegedly unique human ability to make 
choices. Premise 4 has failed just as resoundingly as 
premises 1-3. Harrison's overall argument consists ofa 
series of inadequately supported statements, hasty 
generalizations, and question-begging assumptions. The 
assumptions that nonhumans cannot make choices, 
consciously learn, or have even undeveloped psyches, 
already portray them as machines. Humans, by contrast, 
are portrayed as free, uniquely insulated from natural 
selection, potentially magnificently brave, virtuous 
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beings. Seldom since the days ofDescartes has the deck 
been stacked so high against nonhumans. 
Harrison seems to realize that his argument is 
unconvincing. The last part of his article now takes a. 
stunning turn: he appears to concede that rwnhumans 
can experience pain, but denies that this pain co~ld be 
significant. 
B. Why nonhuman pain is allegedly insignificant 
Harrison begins by providing us with a series of 
thought experiments to help us imagine what it would 
be like to act as if one is in pain in response to stimuli 
that we find painful and "yet not feel pain."54 However, 
the.examples he goes on to sketch are really meant to 
support the conclusion that any pain felt by a nonhuman 
is experientially and morally insignificant. Long before 
Harrison's day, Descartes also appeared to be running 
both these lines simultaneously. Although he assured 
us that nonhumans could only be automata, he also 
claimed that they were capable of sensation. 55 
Occasionally, an ambiguity hides the contradiction (e.g., 
Harrison's assertion that "animals do not experience 
pain as we dO,"56) but a contradiction it nevertheless is. 
Harrison asks us to imagine three cases: a man who 
has violent nightmares that he never remembers, ~ drug 
that immobilizes one without anesthetic and makes one 
forget any pain that occurred under its influence, and 
our inability to remember any pain suffered as infants. 
The common thread in these cases is the inability to 
recall pain. Surely, Harrison presses, such experiences 
must be insignificant. Only experiences that we can sort 
57in with our other experiences can be "owned" by US.
Nonhumans, Harrison assumes without argument as he 
has throughout his discussion, are like infants: they 
"have no self," are mere bundles ofdiscrete sensations, 
are incapable ofdoing any such sorting, ofremembering 
that they have been in pain.58 He no longer claims that 
pain has not occurred: "I am not implying here that 
painful experiences which are forgotten were never 
painful to start with."59 However, significant pain 
requires "a continuity of consciousness" open only to 
older humans (unless, of course, one is greatly mentally 
impaired-a possibility conspicuously absent from his 
entire discussion, although it poses well-known 
problems for theodicy.) 
Harrison is no better off going with this half of the 
contradiction than he was in denying pain altogether 
to nonhumans. First, Harrison does not begin to show 
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that nonhumans have insufficient continuity of 
consciousness to remember pain. Once again, the 
double standard clicks into place: when I avoid the 
bully Who beat me senseless yesterday, I am 
remembering my. painful experience and acting 
appropriately; when Beauregard Beagle cowers away 
from the human who kicked him repeatedly yesterday, 
heis gripped by unconscious instinct!60 Second, even 
if he were correct in claiming that nonhumans and 
some humans cannot remember pain, this could hardly 
render insignificant the pain that he admits takes place. 
I could beat you mercilessly, then give you a drug that 
would remove all your memories of the beating. 
Plainly, your suffering would still be immense, and I 
would be wronging you by inflicting it. As Rollin 
points out in discussing a similar view, if it were really 
true that nonhumans could remember no past pain, 
during a time of suffering they would be incapable of 
remembering pain's absence; thus they would be 
trapped in an agonizing, unending present. 61 How 
could one be justified in focusing on the beings they 
willbecome in the future, when as Harrison has it they 
will have forgotten, rather than on the beings who are 
suffering right now? Surely, one owes more to 
someone who is suffering than to someone who is 
oblivious to suffering, especially if we are ourselves 
inflicting the pain! 
. It is now necessary to speak for human infants, 
who have been tarred with the same brush applied to 
nonhumans. The degree to which infants have 
continuity of consciousness is debatable: their nervous 
systems are less well developed than the nervous 
sy&tems of adult mammals. Still, the parts of the 
nervous system linked to pain perception are all 
functional. All the neurophysiological equipment 
necessary for pain perception in humans (and for 
vertebrates in general) is present in those humans well 
before birth, at 25 to 26 weeks after conception. (This 
also holds for many nonhumans during the last 
trimester.)62 Although Harrison asserts that "we regard 
neonatal pain as less significant than pain which is 
experienced later in life,"63 we have excellent reason 
to believe that this pain can be very significant indeed. 
Fo~ many years, in fact, doctors assumed that infants 
fel~ little or no pain, or at least no serious pain, even 
during major surgery, which was routinely performed 
without anesthesia or (more recently) with only light 
anesthesia.64 Neurologists no longer believe this to be 
the case. Carefully controlled studies have shown that 
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human neonates who are deeply anesthetized during 
surgery have greatly reduced levels of hormones 
associated with stress in their blood afterwards, cry 
less in the days after the operation, and, most 
importantly, have a much better chance of surviving 
than traditionally treated infants. Even infants 
undergoing a relatively minor operation like circum­
cision show benefits from local anesthesia: they cry 
much less during and after the procedure and have 
lower levels of stress hormones than their unanes­
thetized counterparts.65 In fact, it is now thought by 
pain researchers that babies and very young children 
may experience more pain than adults, because a 
"damping" mechanism which helps to cut down on 
the severity ofpain experiences does not develop until 
later.66 Only those who believe that mind and body 
are hermetically sealed compartments could think that 
physiology and appropriate behavior (e.g., crying) 
need have nothing to do with suffering. Being unable 
to verbalize one's pain makes it more likely that one's 
pain will be ignored or disavowed; this has been just 
as true for humans as it has been for nonhumans. 
Luckily, it does seem to be true that we are less able 
to remember pain occurring early in life than pain . 
occurring later; that does not make the initial 
experience any less agonizing, or make the infliction 
of such pain any more permissible. 
Thus, Harrison has failed to show that nonhuman 
(and human neonate) pain is insignificant, just as he 
earlier failed to show that no such pain exists. 
Whichever half of the contradiction one seizes, one is 
not rationally persuaded. Harrison provides no support 
whatever for his key claims about the distinction 
between humans (only some of them!) and non­
humans, viz., that only humans are not subject to the 
strictures of natural selection, are free, and possess 
continuity of consciousness. (How it is possible for 
nonhumans to be intelligent, creative, and even learn 
American Sign Language, as we have seen him admit 
in a footnote but not in his text, without a highly 
complex integrated consciousness is an impenetrable 
mystery.) Harrison is also utterly unable to show that 
this concatenation of allegedly unique qualities 
restricts suffering to normal adult humans. Opponents 
of the argument from evil will have to look elsewhere 
for a dissolution of nonhuman suffering; so will 
opponents of the ascription of moral status to 
nonhumans. Let us now tum to another participant in 
the Neo-Cartesian revival. 
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Carruthers' Attack on Nonhuman Suffering 
Peter Carruthers never mentions the name of Rene 
Descartes, or refers to mind body dualism, but he clearly 
subscribes to Descartes' machine model of non­
humans.67 Like Descartes, he claims to show that 
nonhumans or "brutes," as he prefers to call them­
cannot suffer. Unlike Harrison, he never wavers from 
this contention. Note, however, some potentially 
confusing terminology. He does ascribe "pain 
experiences" to nonhumans, but he denies that a 
"feeling" component is logically linked to the concept 
of experience.68 For those of us who fmd the concept 
ofan experience without a feeling component to be self­
contradictory, Carruthers suggests we recast his 
conclusion in our own language: he is arguing for the 
nonexistence of pain experiences (feelings of pain)­
or, in fact, any experiences-in nonhumans. First, I will 
summarize his argument, then I will tum to a brief 
evaluation of it, mainly covering ground unplowed by 
Johnson's recent fme critique of the same article.69 
Why nonhumans allegedly cannot suffer 
l. Humanshave two types of"experiences." conscious 
and unconscious (e.g., thinking aboutdinner while 
driving home and being unable to recall driving 
when one arrives; daydreaming about the article 
you are working on while, all unawares, washing 
and stacking dishes as usual; as a "blindsighted" 
person, being able to catch a ball while denying 
that one sees anything); unconscious experiences 
"do notfeellike anything."7o 
2. The best analysis of the difference between our 
conscious and unconscious experiences is based 
on suggestions by Daniel Dennett: the former and 
not the latter are "available to conscious thought, 
" where conscious thought is itself "available to 
be thought about in tum."7l 
3. It is obvious that "brutes" cannot think about their 
experiences in acts of thinking that can themselves 
be scrutinized.72 
4. Although one might think that the very nature of 
pain is to demand our conscious awareness (in 
normal circumstances), to stimulate our with­
drawal, this cannot be true of nonhumans, as 
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argued above; the mechanism of avoidance could 
be in place unaccompanied by any feeling of 
pain.73 
5.lfnonhumans, as has been argued, cannot suffer, 
even though they act as if they do, they are due no 
moral concern on our part (e.g., it is "morally 
objectionable" to criticize factory farming, or 
indeed to feel any sympathy for nonhumans).74 
Carruthers and Harrison wrote their articles 
independently and had them published in the same 
year, preventing one from responding to the other. 
They have much in common, despite their very 
different approaches. Clearly, both Carruthers and 
Harrison think that nonhumans' allegedly impoverished 
mentalities block awareness of pain: they follow 
Descartes by intellectualizing suffering. It is possible, 
though, that Carruthers would attack the last part of 
Harrison's article-the argument that nonhuman pain 
is insignificant-as being based on the confusion of 
conscious with unconscious states. Carruthers might say 
that if (to put it in Harrison's language) there is no 
continuity of identity, no self, no "owning of the pain," 
then the nonhuman is not aware ofbeing in pain. Now, 
putting it in Carruthers' terms. this would mean that 
the nonhuman has no conscious experience of pain: on 
his view, nothing hurts, even though the nonhuman 
behaves as if something hurts. We persist in thinking 
that suffering is taking place, he could say, because the 
argument from analogy distracts us from the vital 
distinction between conscious experience and machine­
like behavior. This way of recasting the last part of 
Harrison's attack on nonhuman suffering would at least 
dispel the contradiction between that part and his case 
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for the nonexistence of nonhuman pain. The initial case 
made by Harrison would remain as unconvincing as 
ever, however. Is Carruthers any more successful in 
making his own case for the nonexistence ofnonhuman 
suffering? No, as I shall argue below. 
Carruthers' inability to account/or nonhuman 
animal behavior 
Carruthers gives us no account of how nonhuman 
animals can behave as they do if all of their 
"experiences" are unconscious (or, to put it in the more 
natural way, if they have no experiences at all). Indeed, 
the very examples he uses to illustrate the consciousl 
unconscious distinction,drawn ofnecessity from human 
experience, make no sense whatever in a context where 
no conscious experience has ever occurred. His dramatic 
example of "blindsightedness" (having no conscious 
experience of seeing because of lesions in the visual 
cortex, but being able to catch balls, identify objects, 
etc.) involves people who once did have conscious 
experiences of seeing. The same holds for the far more 
common examples of driving without being aware that 
you are, etc. Complex habitual actions can certainly 
occur without our being aware of them, but we had to 
be consciously aware of performing such actions in the 
first place in order to learn to do them. You cannot be a 
driver or a dishwasher without this initial attention. 
Moreover, ifwe sometimes do not pay attention to these 
actions any more, it is because we are aware of 
something else that distracts us from tlie task at hand. 
Whatwould itbe like to perform complex tasks, behave 
appropriately in changing circumstances, etc., without 
ever having any conscious experiences at all? Without 
ever feeling anything? 
Carruthers does not say so, but perhaps he would 
respond as Harrison has in a different context, 
representing nonhuman behavior as largely a matter 
of reflex and instinct. One need not be conscious to 
respond if one is "programmed." However, as 
ethologists have shown, much nonhuman behavior is 
far too complex, varied, and apparently creative to 
represent as mere instinctual or reflex activity. I cannot 
resist giving a personal example here. My husband 
and I have two feline companions, Callisto and 
Ganymede. Since kittenhood, the two have found the 
nearest bed and crawled under the blanket when loud 
thunder, firecrackers, or frightening strangers have 
made themselves apparent. It is hard enough to 
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imagine them doing this while feeling nothing, but 
consider the next development. Just recently, in these 
same frightening circumstances, Ganymede began 
spontaneously to run to the sliding hall closet door, 
work it ajar with his paw, and climb into its dark 
recesses. Neither cat had ever done this before, and 
we certainly didn't encourage them to do so (our shoes 
are always so hairy afterwards). At frrst, Callisto would 
follow him in at those times. Now she opens the door 
herself, using a different maneuver: at half her 
brother's size, she cannot manage the task with one 
paw, so she flings herself to the floor, lies on her side, 
and uses both paws. Sometimes Ganymede runs up in 
the midst of this project and shoves the door ajar before 
she can finish; then they both scramble in. Neither of 
them tries to open the closet under nonfrightening 
circumstances. Callisto, at frrst a follower, soon began 
to go in even more often than her brother: she, always 
the more fearful (how else can one describe it?) of the 
two, breaks into the closet whenever someone rings 
the doorbell; he curiously (so it seems!) waits to greet 
the visitor at the top of the stairs. All of this behavior 
is explicable if one assumes that the cats are afraid, 
are consciously trying to gain reassurance, believe that . 
the closet is a safe place, and are bright enough to 
learn how to force the closet door ajar. Moreover, 
neither carbon-copies the behavior of the other. How 
can we begin to understand what is going on if we 
assume that they feel nothing at all? 
The background assumption of nonhuman animal 
consciousness fits plausibly with the hypothesis that 
they have unconscious experiences as well. As I write 
this paper, I am seldom aware of the placement of my 
feet (except for now!); there seems to be too much to 
be concerned about at any given time to open one's 
awareness to everything one is sensing. Nonhuman 
animal behavior is consistent with the same phenom­
enon. A cat watching a bird perched just out of reach 
will focus hard on the delectable item; she chatters and 
swishes her tail back and forth rapidly. Is she 
consciously aware of all this activity in her nether 
region? We do not know, but she seems to have eyes 
only for the "meal on wings." Now, gently putting your 
unshod foot on the eat's tail results in behavior we would 
call "confused" if it occurred in a human. She stops 
chattering at the bird, looks around at you, tries to pull 
away her tail, and may meow sharply at you. The intent, 
wide-eyed look is gone. Carruthers' description of the 
writer planning his paper while mechanically washing 
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the dishes comes to mind. If a dish breaks, the content 
ofone's awareness shifts; if someone immobilizes your 
tail while you are lusting after the unobtainable, you 
try to yank it loose. All of this human and nonhuman 
behavior makes excellent sense when we assume that 
consciousness is not an item inexplicably reserved for 
bipedal, peltless primates. 
Carruthers has an especially difficult time 
explaining how "pain-like" behavior in nonhumans is 
to be understood. It is hard to fathom how a nonhuman 
whose paw is stepped on can scream, race away, and 
hide while feeling absolutely nothing. The only 
explanation Carruthers gives of such behavior is an 
attempted extension of the blindsightedness phenom­
enon. He argues that it is in principle possible for a 
being to act conscious when he or she is not. However, 
with regard to pain, he admits that there are no known 
human cases of having pain without feeling it, and he 
himself points out that the pain mechanism-a 
mechanism shared by nonhumans-cannot be 
truncated in the way the visual cortex can in 
blindsightedness. He even states that: 
There is an obvious reason for [the lack of 
evidence that humans can bave pain without 
. feeling it], since part of the function of pain is 
to intrude upon consciousness, in order that 
one may give one's full attention to taking 
evasive action. 75 
This excellent logic leads one to think that 
nonhumans too must feel pain,but Carruthers resists 
the implication. He is plainly convinced that his 
analysis of the difference between conscious and 
nonconscious states has already shown that non­
humans can feel nothing. Let us turn, finally, to that 
analysis itself. 
A problem with Carruthers' analysis of the 
conscious/unconscious distinction 
The problem can be stated very briefly. Carruthers 
gives no convincing defense of his analysis of the 
distinction between conscious and unconscious 
"experiences." He defends his Dennett-based view that 
any conscious experience can be consciously thought 
about, but he does not defend his additional claim that 
one must be able to think about that thought in turn in 
order to have a conscious experience. Why should one 
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have to be able to mull over one's thoughts about one's 
experiences in order to have the experience-to feel 
something-in the first place? Quite a few humans 
would be automata on this viewe6 If one employs 
Occam's razor to lop off the extra layer on Carruthers' 
analysis, dropping the requirement that one be able to 
think about one's thought about one's experience, it is 
no longer implausible to imagine that nonhumans<and 
many humans) can "think things consciously to 
themselves." As Johnson very rightly points out, one 
would think this implausible only if one requires 
thoughts to be expressible in a language, and Carruthers 
himself denies that such a requirement is necessary.77 
Why shouldn't the cat be aware that she is afraid during 
a thunderstorm and take deliberate steps to feel safer? 
Carruthers' account is far less plausible than the 
hypothesis that this is exactly what is happening. 
Thus, neither Harrison nor Carruthers has succeeded 
in resurrecting the Cartesian machine-model of 
nonhuman animals. On their views, actual nonhuman 
animal behaviorrequires a cosmic puppeteer; otherwise, 
it is a bottomless mystery. The real mystery here is how 
clever, sophisticated philosophers can lead themselves 
so thoroughly astray. The ad hominem fallacy is indeed 
to be avoided, but one cannot help wondering if 
Descartes and his modem counterparts would have 
argued as they did, had they not had such powerful 
incentives to deny nonhuman suffering as a devotion 
to vivisection, factory farming, or theodicy, and a 
common vision of human superiority. 
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